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Suppose that a person, call him Andrew, has a desire to drink a cup of tea. He boils
the kettle, pours the hot water into the teacup, places the teacup on a side table, and
sits down next to it to wait for the tea to brew. When Andrew looks away, and
before he is able to satisfy his desire, Beata quickly pours Andrew’s tea into a
nearby plant pot because she believes that caffeine is bad for Andrew’s health. Let
us call this example Tea Plant.
Now imagine a different case. Andrew has the desire to drink a cup of tea, and
then, rather than pouring away the tea, Beata sprays a chemical in the air that stops
Andrew drinking that cup of tea: as Andrew begins to lift the cup to his lips, the
spray extinguishes his desire to drink the tea. Andrew knows that Beata’s spray was
the cause of this change. Let us call this example Tea Spray.1
In both Tea Plant and Tea Spray, Beata prevents Andrew’s desire to drink the
cup of tea from being satisfied, and in both cases, this is plausibly pro tanto wrong—
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wrong, absent defeaters.2 Nevertheless, we suspect that many would judge there to
be a moral difference between these cases—they would judge that the intervention
in Tea Spray is in some respect more pro tanto wrong than the intervention in Tea
Plant. That is to say, there is some feature of Beata’s action in Tea Spray that
renders it wrong, absent defeaters, and that is either not possessed by her action in
Tea Plant, or would be more easily defeated in that case.
One way in which one might attempt to account for intuitive judgements about
these cases would be to invoke the following principle:
The Internal-External Principle (IEP): It is in one respect more pro tanto
wrong if B internally frustrates A’s desire that x—that is, prevents it from
coming about that x by altering A’s desire that x—than if B externally
frustrates A’s desire that x—that is, prevents it from coming about that x
through altering A’s environment.
IEP seems able to account for the putative moral difference between Tea Plant and
Tea Spray, for Tea Plant involves external desire frustration, while Tea Spray
involves internal desire frustration. We think that the ability of IEP to capture
intuitive differences between these cases gives us some reason to accept it, or at
least, take it seriously as a moral hypothesis. However, perhaps some would have
different intuitive responses to these cases; responses that do not support IEP. Still,
we think there are at least two further reasons to take IEP seriously.
First, the idea contained in IEP is itself plausible. There is a sense in which
internally frustrating a desire is more intrusive than externally frustrating it, and it
would not be surprising if more intrusive means of frustrating desires were more
morally problematic than less intrusive ones. Consider, by analogy, the morality of
bodily interference. It would be widely accepted that nonconsensually interfering
with a person’s body by physically constraining him—say, by locking him in a room
or pinning him to the floor—is typically less problematic than nonconsensually
internally interfering with his body by performing a surgical procedure. One
plausible way in which we might account for this is by invoking the idea that the
degree of physical invasiveness makes a moral difference.3 One could think of IEP
as positing a parallel difference between different forms of interference with the
2 Unless otherwise stated, when we claim that an action is wrong we mean pro tanto wrong, that is,
wrong absent defeaters. We take it that the pro tanto wrongness of an action is a matter of degree such
that, the greater an action’s pro tanto wrongness, the stronger the defeating consideration would need to
be for the action to be morally permissible—i.e., not morally wrong—all things considered.
3 As is often the case, the law follows common sense morality here, treating more physically invasive forms of
interference as more serious (legal) wrongs. For example, in England and Wales, non-consensual bodily
interference that involves physical contact constitutes the tort of battery, which is actionable per se, but battery
is not available in respect of interventions that do not involve physical contact, since touching is an element of
the tort; here negligence is the only potential source of liability (Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432), and a
patient could bring a successful claim in negligence only if she could establish injury and causation. Moreover,
within the class of interferences that involve physical contact, those that are more physically invasive are often
treated as more serious wrongs. For example, in England and Wales, any non-consensual bodily interference
constitutes the tort battery and therefore incurs potential civil liability, but bodily interference that breaks the
skin would normally also constitute ‘actual bodily harm’ (ABH) or more serious injury, which could be a
criminal offence contrary the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 18, 20 or 47 (depending on severity of
injury and intent). We thank Lisa Forsberg for her helpful comments on this point.
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mind. Altering a desire seems in one respect more mentally intrusive than merely
externally frustrating it.4
Second, IEP seems potentially capable of accounting for some views that are
widely held in public and academic debate regarding three types of intervention,
which we will refer to collectively as the Practical Cases.
The first of these Practical Cases has been discussed in recent literature in
criminal justice ethics. There has been some debate recently concerning whether
and when criminal offenders might permissibly be offered, or forced to receive,
mind-altering drugs designed to prevent them from committing future offences. On
one side of the debate, the practice of imposing mind-altering drugs as a condition
of early release or parole has been criticised on the ground that, when the only
alternative is to remain incarcerated, an offender cannot give valid consent to
receive a mind-altering drug, because the offer is coercive.5 The dominant response
has been that, although offenders offered a choice between receiving mind-altering
drugs and further incarceration face pressure to consent to receive the drugs, the
pressure is not coercive, or does not undermine the offender’s autonomy. As such, in
these circumstances, an offender could give valid consent to receive a mind-altering
drug.6 Interestingly, a number of authors on both sides of this debate have assumed
that it is more problematic to nonconsensually impose such drugs on an offender
than it is to incarcerate an offender.7 IEP could potentially explain this.
IEP may also be able to account for a widely held view regarding ‘nudge’
techniques, the second of our Practical Cases. On one account, B nudges A when
she makes it more likely that A performs some action, by triggering A’s automatic
cognitive processes.8 One example of a nudge is placing pictures of diseased lungs
4 We take it that where an intervention falls on the internal-external divide is one determinant of its
intrusiveness, but that there may also be other factors. For example, within the category of internal
interferences there may be differences in intrusiveness due to, say, the centrality of the altered desire to
the person’s personality.
5 K.A. Vanderzyl. Castration as an Alternative to Incarceration: An Impotent Approach to the
Punishment of Sex Offenders. Northern Illinois University Law Review 1994; 15: 107–140, W. Green.
Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offenders. University of Dayton Law Review 1986;
12: 1–26.
6 C.S. Rosati. A Study of Internal Punishment. Wisconsin Law Review 1994; 1994: 123–170, J. Ryberg.
Punishment, Pharmacological Treatment, and Early Release. International Journal of Applied Philosophy
2012; 26: 231–244. A. Wertheimer & F. Miller, G. There Are (STILL) No Coercive Offers. Journal of
Medical Ethics 2013, J. Ryberg & T. Petersen. Neurotechnological Behavioural Treatment of Criminal
Offenders—A Comment on Bomann-Larsen. Neuroethics 2013; 6: 79–83.
7 See, for example, Scott, C. L, and T. Holmberg. ‘‘Castration of Sex Offenders: Prisoners’ Rights Versus
Public Safety.’’ Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 31, no. 4 (2003): 502–509;
Vanderzyl, Kari A. ‘‘Castration as an Alternative to Incarceration: An Impotent Approach to the
Punishment of Sex Offenders.’’ Northern Illinois University Law Review 15 (1995 1994): 107–140;
Green, W. ‘‘Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offenders: Statutory and Constitutional
Issues.’’ U. Dayton L. Rev. 12 (1986): 1–26; Bomann-Larsen, Lene. ‘‘Voluntary Rehabilitation? On
Neurotechnological Behavioural Treatment, Valid Consent and (In)appropriate Offers.’’ Neuroethics 6,
no. 1 (April 1, 2013): 65–77. These authors assume that anti-libidinal medications should be provided to
sex offenders only with their valid consent, though they do not object to nonconsensual incarceration.
8 This is an adapted definition of nudging from Y. Saghai. Salvaging the concept of nudge. Journal of
Medical Ethics 2013, R.H. Thaler & C.R. Sunstein. 2008. Nudge: improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth, and Happiness. London: Yale University Press.
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on cigarette packets to create reactions of disgust in order to discourage the smoking
of tobacco.9 Another example is placing food with high-fat content further from eye
level than healthier food in a cafeteria in order to discourage people from eating the
high-fat food.10 It is sometimes thought that nudging an individual so that she
chooses not to do x is in some cases more morally problematic than simply
prohibiting x.11 IEP may be able to justify such a view. Nudges may sometimes
involve changing behaviour through altering desires, and according to IEP this is in
one respect more problematic than externally frustrating these desires, for example,
through legal prohibitions.12
Finally, IEP also seems capable of accounting for widely held moral qualms
regarding hypnosis, brainwashing and subliminal advertising. These techniques are
generally assumed to be highly morally problematic and certainly more problematic
than external forms of desire frustration.13 Indeed, it has recently been argued that
they should sometimes be criminalised on the basis that they constitute an
objectionable form of mental interference.14 Once again, IEP may be able to
accommodate these views, since hypnosis, brainwashing and subliminal advertising
arguably all involve the internal frustration of desires, at least in their typical cases.
IEP thus gains initial plausibility from at least three sources. First, it can capture
intuitions regarding certain imaginary cases such as those with which we began this
paper. Second, it has some theoretical plausibility, independent of its plausible
implications for these cases. Third, it is able to account for some widely held views
in public and academic debate.
Nevertheless, the aim of this paper will be to subject IEP to critical scrutiny. We
argue that IEP can be accepted only in a highly attenuated form—a form so
attenuated that it lacks the most significant practical implications of the original
version. In Section 1, we consider whether and how IEP might be modified to better
accommodate a range of case-based intuitions. This leads us to replace IEP, as it is
formulated above, with a more modest variant. In Section 2, we suggest that, though
this modified variant of IEP handles a range of cases plausibly, the most promising
explanation for its correctness appeals to a dubious thesis concerning the value of
autonomous thought. We suggest that it may thus require further modification.
Finally, in Section 3, we set out the implications of our modifications to IEP. We
show that the resulting, heavily modified variant of IEP is unable to account for the
9 C.R. Sunstein. 2013. Simpler: The Future of Government. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 133.
Importantly, there is a difference between displaying images to create disgust and providing statistics with
the aim of informing people about the risks of smoking. The latter is not a nudge because it does not
depend on a trigger of a person’s automatic cognitive processes.
10 Thaler & Sunstein. 2008. Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. p. 1.
11 For evidence that supports that covert influences on behaviour are considered less objectionable than
overt influences see: G. Felsen, et al. Decisional enhancement and autonomy: public attitudes towards
overt and covert nudges. Judgment and Decision Making 2013; 8: 202–213.
12 T. Goodwin. Why We Should Reject ‘Nudge’. Politics 2012; 32: 85–92.
13 See for instance: R. Crisp. Persuasive Advertising, Autonomy, and the Creation of Desire. Journal of
Business Ethics 1987; 6: 413–418.
14 J.C. Bublitz & R. Merkel. Crimes Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human
Right to Mental Self-Determination. Criminal Law and Philosophy 2012.
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wrongness of many common incidents of the three Practical Cases introduced
above. This implies that those who hold that interferences involved in these
Practical Cases are particularly morally problematic should either give up this view,
or provide a different explanation for their wrongness.
Before we proceed to that task, however, we should make four clarifications
regarding the content and scope of IEP. Recall that, according to IEP, it is in one
respect more pro tanto wrong if B internally frustrates A’s desire that x than if B
externally frustrates A’s desire that x. But what is it to frustrate a desire? We
understand frustrating a desire to consist in intentionally bringing it about that the
desire is not satisfied.15 This means that a desire can be frustrated without the person
who has the desire being aware that the desire has been frustrated. It is thus
important to distinguish frustrating a desire, and the feeling of frustration when a
desire is not satisfied; the latter is not necessarily present when the former occurs.
We assume also that a desire can be frustrated even if the desire is no longer present
at the time the desired state of affairs would have occurred. For example, suppose
that A desires at T1 that x occur at subsequent time T2, though at T2, B no longer
desires x. Suppose further that B brings it about that x does not occur at T2. On our
account, B has frustrated A’s T1 desire.
16
Our second clarification concerns the concept of altering a desire. We earlier
noted that one internally frustrates a desire when one frustrates the desire by altering
it. We assume that there are three ways in which a desire could be altered:
(1) the object of the desire is changed;
(2) the strength of the desire is changed, either increased or decreased;17 and
(3) the desire is extinguished, such that the person no longer has that desire.
We include within category (1) both cases in which the object of a desire is altered
in such a way that a new desire is a created, so that the old desire is replaced with a
new one, and cases (if there are any such) in which the object of the desire is altered
but the desire survives the change—the alteration does not affect the identity of the
15 We also assume that in all of the cases discussed throughout the paper, the interfering agent acts with
the intention that the other agent’s desire is not satisfied. Although some may hold that the wrongness of
the interference would change if the interfering agent did not intend to frustrate the desire, with this
assumption, we set aside whether this intention of the interfering agent affects the permissibility of his
actions. For discussion of this debate, see: Victor Tadros. 2012. The Ends of Harm: The Moral
Foundations of Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 7.
16 It could be objected that a T1 desire that x occur at T2 is frustrated by an interference only if the agent
would have continued to have this desire at T2 had the interference not taken place. We disagree, and
think that it is plausible to think that a T1 desire that x occur at T2 can be frustrated even if the desire
would no longer have existed at T2. We think this can be seen by considering cases of posthumous desire
frustration. Suppose A desires that after her death her work will be respected. Suppose that her work is not
respected after her death. It seems to us that A’s desire is frustrated, even though the desire would not
exist after her death.
17 It might be unclear how an increase in strength of a desire could result in the frustration of that desire,
but it is possible to imagine cases in which this occurs. Suppose that Ruth desires to be friends with Ollie,
but this desire is so strong that her behavior becomes obsequious—she laughs too loudly at his jokes,
offers too much help—to the extent that her behavior becomes annoying to Ollie. In this case, the strength
of her desire to be friends with Ollie makes it less likely that her desire is satisfied, than if it were less
strong.
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desire.18 Similarly, we include within category (2) both changes in strength that
involve replacing the initial desire with a new, weaker or stronger desire, and cases
that instead involve altering the strength of a desire that survives the alteration. We
remain silent on what determines whether a desire survives an alteration in content
or strength.
Third, we should note that the categories of internal and external frustration of
desires, as posited by IEP, are not exhaustive. There are other ways in which a
desire could be frustrated. For example, B could frustrate A’s autonomous desire
that x by:
(i) altering A’s other desires, for example, by strengthening competing
desires.
(ii) introducing some entirely new desire in A, for example, a desire that not-x,
without altering A’s existing desires.
(iii) altering A’s non-desire mental states, for example, beliefs.
(iv) altering A’s non-mental internal bodily states, for example, by inducing
temporary paralysis.
None of these means of frustrating a desire would qualify as either internal or
external desire frustration, as we have characterised those categories. They do not
operate by altering A’s desire, but nor do they operate by altering A’s environment.
In this paper, we will, as far as possible, remain silent on the moral status of
frustrating an autonomous desire neither internally nor externally.
Finally, fourth, we exclude from the category of external desire frustration cases
in which the environment is altered, and this prevents a person’s desire from being
satisfied, but it does so via the means of altering that person’s mental or bodily states
(including that person’s desires). Consider again Tea Spray, in which Beata exposes
Andrew to a spray that extinguishes his desire to drink the cup of tea. Though there
is a sense in which Beata here alters Andrew’s environment and this frustrates his
desire, the environmental change exerts its effect by altering Andrew’s mental or
bodily states (in this case, his desire to drink tea). We thus do not class it as an
instance of external desire frustration. In Tea Plant, by contrast, the environmental
manipulation does not frustrate Andrew’s desire by altering his mental or bodily
states; it does so simply by making the tea unavailable.
1.
IEP, as formulated above, is susceptible to counterexamples. Consider the following
case:
18 Suppose that Jack has a desire to eat ice cream. He then sees a passerby eating chocolate ice cream.
This reminds him how much he likes chocolate ice cream, which results in his desire to eat ice cream
being transformed into a desire to eat chocolate ice cream specifically. We take it to be somewhat
plausible (though certainly not obvious) that Jack’s earlier desire to eat ice cream and later desire to eat
chocolate ice cream are different phases of the same desire, rather than numerically distinct desires.
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Tea Reasons: Andy has a desire to drink a cup of tea. He boils the kettle, pours
the hot water into the teacup, places the teacup on a side table, and sits down
next to it to wait for the tea to brew. Betty believes that caffeine is bad for
Andy’s health. Before Andy is able to satisfy this desire to drink a cup of tea,
and without asking Andy’s permission, Betty correctly tells Andy that
drinking tea is bad for his health. Andy believes Betty’s claim, and takes it to
give him conclusive reasons not to drink tea. As a result, his desire to drink the
tea dissipates.
In Tea Reasons, Betty’s action clearly prevents the satisfaction of Andy’s desire to
drink tea by altering that desire. Her action results in Andy’s desire to drink tea
being extinguished. Thus, if IEP is correct, her intervention in this case is more pro
tanto wrong in one respect than Beata’s intervention in Tea Plant. But this is
implausible.19
We might wonder, however, whether it is possible to modify IEP so as to
accommodate Tea Reasons. Consider:
The Perception Variant: It is in one respect more pro tanto wrong if B
prevents the satisfaction of A’s desire that x by non-perceptually altering that
desire than if B externally frustrates A’s desire that x.
We take it that B prevents the satisfaction of A’s desire that x perceptually just in
case she alters the desire by changing A’s environment in a way that B perceives.
Otherwise, she alters the desire non-perceptually. It is clear that, in Tea Reasons,
Betty alters Andy’s desire perceptually: Andy’s desire is altered only because he
hears certain utterances made by Betty. On the other hand, it is clear that, in Tea
Spray, Beata alters Andrew’s desire non-perceptually. Andrew’s neural, and thus
mental, states are altered via a biological process that does not result in his
perceiving any environmental change.
The Perception Variant of the IEP seems capable of distinguishing Tea Reasons
from Tea Spray, and may thus be capable of explaining why Tea Spray seems in one
respect more pro tanto wrong than Tea Plant, but Tea Reasons does not. However, it
fails to yield plausible verdicts regarding other cases that we might expect IEP to
capture. We could modify Tea Spray so that perceptual processes are involved. Let
us do this by imagining that rather than spraying a chemical in the air, Beata
employs hypnosis to stop Andrew from drinking that cup of tea: she gently swings
her pocket watch in front of his eyes, while talking softly to him. As Andrew begins
to lift the cup to his lips, the hypnosis causes him, without his knowledge, to enter a
hypnotic state, during which the hypnotist extinguishes his desire to drink the tea.
To Andrew it appears that he has whimsically changed his mind. Let us call this
case Tea Hypnosis.
Unlike Tea Spray, Tea Hypnosis plausibly involves perceptual alterations to
Andrew’s desires: the hypnosis procedure operates through perceptual channels.
19 It has, however, been suggested that rational persuasion is not without its problems. See: R. Nozick.
1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Massachusetts. pp. 4–8. G. Tsai. Rational Persuasion as
Paternalism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 2014; 42: 78–112.
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The Perception Variant of the IEP thus cannot account for the intuitively plausible
view that Tea Hypnosis is in one respect more pro tanto wrong than Tea Plant.20
Perhaps we can instead invoke:
The Resistibility Variant: It is in one respect more pro tanto wrong if B
prevents the satisfaction of A’s desire that x by irresistibly altering A’s desire
that x than if B externally frustrates A’s desire that x.
We take it that B irresistibly alters A’s desire that x if she alters it in such a way
that it is not possible for A to prevent his desire that x from being altered.21 It might
seem that in both Tea Spray and Tea Hypnosis, it is impossible for A to prevent his
desire that x from being altered by B, whereas in Tea Reasons it is not. However, the
difficulty with attempting to account for our intuitive reactions to Tea Reasons by
invoking the Resistibility Variant is that it is not clear that the intervention in Tea
Reasons really is resistible. It might be argued that when one is presented with a
persuasive reason to do something one frequently has no choice but to form the
desire to do that thing.22 Yet, even were it to turn out that the intervention in Tea
Reasons is not resistible, we would, we think, find the intervention described in this
case to be unproblematic.
A further possible explanation for the moral difference between Tea Reasons and
Tea Spray (and Tea Hypnosis) would appeal to the role of the object’s autonomy of
thought in these cases. It might be argued that Tea Reasons engages the autonomy
of thought of its object in a way that Tea Spray and Tea Hypnosis do not. In
accordance with this suggestion, we might modify IEP to:
The Autonomy Variant: It is in one respect more pro tanto wrong if B prevents
the satisfaction of A’s desire that x by non-autonomously altering that desire
than if B externally frustrates A’s desire that x.
B non-autonomously alters A’s desire when B alters A’s desire through means other
than engaging A in autonomous thought. We believe that this variant yields
plausible verdicts regarding the cases we have discussed. According to this variant,
Tea Spray and Tea Hypnosis are in one respect more pro tanto wrong than Tea Plant
and Tea Reasons. This is because Tea Spray and Tea Hypnosis operate by altering a
desire in a way that does not involve the agent’s autonomous thought, whereas Tea
Reasons operates by altering the agent’s desire though engaging the agent in
20 Tea Hypnosis might seem in one respect less morally problematic than Tea Spray. Moreover, the
Perception Variant of IEP might account for this difference. However, Tea Hypnosis still seems more pro
tanto wrong in one respect than Tea Plant, and the Perception Variant cannot account for that difference.
Moreover, we are inclined to think that this is the greater difference: it seems to us that Tea Hypnosis is,
morally speaking, much closer to Tea Spray than to Tea Plant.
21 There are a number of important issues here concerning the notion of possibility that we are unable
address in this paper. For instance we can follow Parfit and draw the distinction between ‘Deep’ and
‘Technical’ impossibilities. Deep impossibilities contravene laws of nature, whereas technical impos-
sibilities are presently impossible but could be possible in the future with the sufficient development of
technology and science. See: D. Parfit. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
p. 219.
22 One related view is that a person cannot choose one’s beliefs, see: J. Raz. 1999. Engaging Reason.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter One.
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autonomous thought, and Tea Plant does not operate by altering the agent’s desire at
all.
The Autonomy Variant of IEP has the virtue of being somewhat theoretically
plausible. More specifically, it is possible to situate the principle within a deep
liberal tradition, including both Kant and Mill, which holds that autonomous
thought is valuable in itself, and independently of the value of the conduct that it
produces.23
To see this, consider why it should be thought pro tanto wrong to alter a person’s
desires in a way that fails to engage the individual’s autonomous thought. The most
obvious answer is that doing so fails to treat the individual as an autonomous agent.
But note that externally frustrating an individual’s desire plausibly also fails to treat
the individual as an autonomous agent. It involves closing off options in preference
to engaging the individual in autonomous thought about which option to choose.
Thus, on this answer, it is unclear why internally frustrating a desire without
engaging a person’s autonomous thought should be considered in one respect more
pro tanto wrong that externally frustrating it. On this answer, the Autonomy Variant
of IEP looks unmotivated.
However, a better answer is available. According to this second answer, altering
A’s desire by means other than engaging A in autonomous thought is problematic
because it amounts to an interference with A’s autonomy of thought. When one
alters a person’s desires through means that do not engage the individual in
autonomous thought, and when one’s alteration of that person’s desires was not
done on the basis of that person’s autonomous wishes, one plausibly interferes with
this person’s autonomy of thought.24
If we accept that autonomous thought is valuable in itself, then it will be
plausible to think that means of altering desires that involve interference with
autonomy of thought are particularly problematic. It might, however, be objected
that autonomy of action, the condition of acting autonomously, is also valuable, and
externally frustrating a desire interferes with that form of valuable autonomy.
However, even if this is so, it will remain plausible that frustrating a desire by
altering it in a way that involves interference with autonomy of thought constitutes a
more serious threat to valuable autonomy than externally frustrating the desire. This
is because both kinds of desire-frustration interfere with autonomy of action, but the
latter also interferes with autonomy of thought.
23 See: J.S. Mill. 1985. On Liberty. London: Penguin Classics. I. Kant. 2005. Critique of Practical
Reason. M. Gregor, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 12. We are not denying that there are
important differences between Kant and Mill with regards to the value of autonomy.
24 This could be explained by an appeal to a historical account of autonomy, according to which a desire
is autonomous only if produced by that individual’s autonomous thought. See for instance, J. Christman.
Autonomy and Personal History. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1991; 21: 1–24. When one alters a
desire in a way that doesn’t engage (and was not the product of) that person’s autonomy of thought, one is
thus effectively inserting a non-autonomous desire.
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2.
We believe that the Autonomy Variant of IEP is the most plausible of the variants
we have considered. However, in this Section, we offer a case for modifying the
Autonomy Variant by challenging the most promising explanation for its
correctness: that autonomy of thought is invariably valuable. In order to do this,
we consider Joseph Raz’s argument concerning the conditional value of autonomy
of action. We then apply Raz’s argument for the conditional value of autonomy of
action to the value of autonomy of thought, which we suggest may also be
conditional. If the value of autonomy of thought is recognised to be conditional, the
most obvious explanation for the correctness of the Autonomy Variant becomes
unavailable, and as a consequence, we tentatively propose a further modification of
this variant.
Before we do this, we should clarify that we are not denying that there might be
other possible explanations for the wrongness of interfering with autonomy of
thought. We do, however, take an explanation appealing to the value of autonomy of
thought to be the most promising candidate explanation. Thus, the problems faced
by that explanation diminish the credence we should place in the Autonomy Variant
of IEP.
According to Raz, ‘‘Autonomous life is valuable only if it is spent in the pursuit
of acceptable and valuable projects and relationships’’.25 Autonomy of action, that
is, the condition of acting autonomously, can possess two kinds of value: the value
of the acts it produces (action-value), and the value of the autonomy itself
(autonomy-value).26 Suppose an autonomous agent exercises his autonomy by
reading War and Peace. The action of reading this work may be valuable, either
because the action of reading a great work of literature is an intrinsically valuable
action, or because it has instrumental value, such as producing pleasure, knowledge,
or something else of value. Thus, the agent’s autonomy with respect to this action
has action-value. But it might also seem to possess autonomy-value. It might seem
that it would have been in one way worse had the agent read War and Peace
nonautonomously—say, at gunpoint.
On Raz’s view, however, the agent’s autonomy of action would not have had any
autonomy-value had it been used to perform an all things considered disvaluable
action.27 The presence of autonomy-value is conditional on the presence of action-
value. If an agent autonomously performs a disvaluable action then the agent’s
autonomy with respect to that action is not valuable in itself. For example, assume
the action of torturing kittens is disvaluable and consider two possible states of
affairs: in one, an agent autonomously tortures a kitten, in another, an agent
25 We understand autonomous life here to be referring to autonomy of action. As will be clear in the
following discussion, the projects and relationships can be either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable.
In places it seems that Raz also holds that that autonomously acting disvaluably diminishes a person’s
wellbeing. For present purposes we will simply assume that it merely is not good in any way, and remain
silent on whether it is an additional bad.
26 We assume that the value of the action is independent of the autonomousness of the action.
27 We henceforth frequently omit ‘all things considered’. ‘Disvaluable’ should be taken to mean ‘all
things considered disvaluable’ unless otherwise specified.
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nonautonomously tortures a kitten (say, at gunpoint). On Raz’s view, the presence
of greater autonomy of action in the first state of affairs does not make that state of
affairs in any respect better than the other. Let us summarise Raz’s view as the
following:
Conditional Action: Autonomy of action lacks autonomy-value when
employed to perform all things considered disvaluable actions.
Raz does not provide much of an argument in support of Conditional Action, and a
comprehensive defence of this view is beyond the scope of the paper.28
Nevertheless, we will now quickly show why it may be a plausible position to
hold.29 There is considerable intuitive force in the idea that it is not better in any
respect when a person autonomously acts disvaluably than when a person performs
the same disvaluable action nonautonomously. To illustrate this, consider the two
following cases:
Ted: Ted hates Jill and plans to kill her if ever an opportunity arises to do so
without being caught. One day such an opportunity does arise and Ted decides
to take it; he kills Jill.
Todd: Todd hates Jill and plans to kill her if ever an opportunity arises to do so
without being caught. This opportunity never arises. But one day he eats some
wild berries containing a rare neurotoxin that temporarily deprives him of all
impulse control while also producing in him a strong desire to kill Jill. He acts
on this desire and kills her.
Let us assume that the action of killing Jill is all things considered disvaluable. Both
Ted and Todd perform the same disvaluable action of killing Jill. However, Todd’s
action of killing Jill is not autonomous because the desire that he acts on is
determined by the neurotoxin. By contrast, Ted’s desire to kill Jill is an autonomous
action. If we were to hold that autonomy of action is unconditionally valuable, we
would have to say that there is something more valuable about the state of affairs
described in the Ted case than about the state of affairs described in the Todd case.
However, it is at the very least doubtful that this is so. This may provide (weak)
support to Conditional Action.
2.1.
Suppose we tentatively accept Conditional Action. It might seem that we should
then also accept that autonomy of thought – understood as the condition of forming
28 Jeremy Waldron criticises Raz’s argument on the basis that it seems to equate the value of autonomy
with the moral praiseworthiness of the person. J. Waldron. Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s
Morality of Freedom. Southern Californian Law Review 1989; 62: 1097–1152. p.1100.
29 Raz claims that Conditional Action refers to both prudential and moral disvalue. Raz holds there is no
meaningful difference between moral and prudential value, as they are both grounded from the same
source. See: J. Raz. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 313–320. We are open
to the possibility that Conditional Action should be restricted to a more narrowly defined form of value,
but for the purposes of this paper it makes little difference in terms of the implications for many of the
Practical Cases.
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and sustaining one’s desires autonomously – also possesses only conditional value.
In particular, it might be thought that autonomy of thought lacks non-instrumental
value when employed to form or sustain desires that are all things considered
disvaluable.30 For example, the desire to gratuitously torture kittens is all-things-
considered disvaluable, and consequently, the autonomous thought deployed to
sustain the autonomous desire to gratuitously torture kittens is valueless. Let us refer
to this as Conditional Thought.
Conditional Thought derives support from Conditional Action. If autonomy of
action has autonomy-value only when deployed to perform valuable actions, it is
plausible that a parallel claim will be true of autonomy of thought. This is because it
is plausible that, if autonomy of action has only conditional value, this is because,
quite generally, autonomy is valuable only if put to good use, and this more general
view will support Conditional Thought.
Conditional Thought has significant implications for the Autonomy Variant.
Recall that the plausibility of this variant was in part due to the fact that non-
autonomously altering a desire amounts to an interference with autonomy of thought
as well as with autonomy of action. It therefore interferes with autonomy to a
greater extent than an external frustration of a desire, which only interferes with
autonomy of action. This difference explained why an internal frustration of a desire
is in one respect more pro tanto wrong than an external frustration of the same
desire. However, on Conditional Thought, autonomy of thought is not valuable
when used to sustain disvaluable desires, and we thus cannot invoke its value to
explain why interfering with both autonomy of thought and autonomy of action is
worse than interfering only with autonomy of action in such cases. This leaves us
without an explanation for why nonautonomously altering A’s desire is more pro
tanto wrong than externally frustrating the desire in cases where A’s autonomy of
thought is being put to disvaluable use.
One response to this would be to seek an alternative explanation for why
interfering with autonomy of action and thought is worse than interfering with
autonomy of action alone—an explanation that does not invoke the value of
autonomy of thought. One might, for instance, seek to show that, regardless of the
value of autonomy of thought, we possess a right against interferences with that
autonomy. We remain open to the possibility that this could be established, though
we are not aware of any plausible explanation for why we should be thought to
possess such a right.
Alternatively, we could seek to accommodate Conditional Thought by making a
further modification to IEP:
The Conditionalized Autonomy Variant: If A’s desire that x is not all-things-
considered disvaluable, it is in one respect more pro tanto wrong if B prevents
the satisfaction of this desire by non-autonomously altering it than if B
externally frustrates the desire.
In the following section, we will demonstrate the significant implications of moving
to this variant of IEP. First, we should consider an objection against the argument of
30 Again, we henceforth frequently omit the ‘all things considered’.
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this section. We have argued that Conditional Action supports Conditional Thought,
which in turn supports the view that it is not always more wrong to frustrate a desire
by non-autonomously altering it than to externally frustrate it. However, one
concern could be that we do not provide a theoretical justification for Conditional
Action, but instead only rely on an example that illuminates its intuitive plausibility.
But it might be objected that Conditional Action also has implications that are
severely counterintuitive. For example, it might be thought that Conditional Action
also shows directly that it is not at all wrong to externally frustrate a desire when
one does so by preventing that desire from giving rise to a disvaluable action. In
externally frustrating a desire in this way, one will plausibly be interfering with
autonomy of action that possesses no autonomy-value according to Conditional
Action. It might seem implausible, however, that it is in no way wrong to externally
frustrate a desire in this way, even if the desire would give rise to a disvaluable
action. It might be objected that this constitutes a reductio of our view. For this
implication might seem far more implausible than the implications of rejecting
Conditional Action. If intuitive plausibility is the basis to accept or reject a view of
the value of autonomy, we should reject Conditional Action.
We accept that this is a reasonable concern about our view. Nevertheless, we
think that this claim of intuitive implausibility can be, in part, defused. For it is not,
we think, clearly in one way wrong to externally interfere with a desire by
preventing it from giving rise to a disvaluable action. We can see this by considering
certain other cases in which externally frustrating a desire is not in any way wrong.
Suppose C sees two strangers in the park, and then has a desire that stranger A
declares her love for stranger B. Stranger A elects not to do so, thus externally
frustrating C’s desire. It is not clear that A has done anything even pro tanto wrong.
For it is none of C’s business what intimate things one stranger says to another. In
this case, C has a desire about something that does not properly fall within the scope
of C’s autonomy, and for this reason, one could not appeal to C’s autonomy to show
that it is in no way wrong for A to externally frustrate C’s desire. But the same
thoughts could plausibly be invoked in relation to cases where we frustrate
autonomous desires by preventing them from giving rise to disvaluable actions: it is
not clear that performing disvaluable actions falls within the proper scope of one’s
autonomy.
Moreover, even if it is always in at least one way wrong to externally frustrate a
desire, it may be possible to endorse Conditional Action. This is because externally
frustrating a desire need not be wrong because it constitutes an interference with
valuable autonomy of action, rather, there could be other reasons why it is wrong.
For example, one could appeal to political liberalism and argue that, due to
reasonable disagreement, it is impermissible for the state to interfere externally (or
indeed internally) with actions that it judges to be disvaluable, as long as those
actions are reasonable.31 Crucially, the impermissibility of this interference is
grounded on concerns that are arguably distinct from autonomy, namely the
31 See Raz. 1999. Engaging Reason. For variations of this view see: J. Rawls. 1999. A Theory of Justice.
Revised edn. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. J. Rawls. 2005. Political
Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
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requirement to respect the equal moral status of each citizen or to remain neutral
been alternative conceptions of the good.32 This could account for the view that it is
wrong in at least one respect to frustrate a disvaluable desire externally, at least in
cases where doing so involves interfering with reasonable actions. But it does not
undermine Conditional Action, since it does not invoke the unconditional value of
autonomy of action. It thus does not undermine our argument for modifying the
Autonomy Variant to the Conditionalized Autonomy Variant.
A related objection has been raised by an anonymous reviewer, namely, that
Conditional Thought could permit reprehensible mind control. If autonomy of
thought lacks non-instrumental value when employed to form or sustain desires that
are all things considered disvaluable, then it might be objected that it would
permissible to non-autonomously intervene to alter these non-instrumentally
disvaluable thoughts. This objection parallels the previous one, except that it
appeals to the implausibility of it being permissible to interfere with disvaluable
desires, rather than to the implausibility of it being permissible to interfere with
disvaluable actions.
Again, we accept that this is a legitimate concern. In particular, there are
difficulties surrounding the correct identification of non-instrumentally disvaluable
autonomy of thought, and as such it is possible that the intervener would make
mistaken judgements and interfere with valuable autonomy of thought. Moreover,
the method of interfering with non-instrumentally disvaluable thoughts could result
in interferences with thoughts that are not non-instrumentally disvaluable. For
example, when administering testosterone-reducing drugs on sex offenders this
might not only extinguish disvaluable desires, but could also extinguish non-
disvaluable desires to have permissible sexual relationships.33 We think that once
we set aside all of the considerable and significant instrumental reasons against non-
autonomously interfering with (even disvaluable) desires, it is not obviously wrong
to interfere such desires.34 But even if, setting aside instrumental reasons, it would
be wrong to non-autonomously interfere with an individual’s disvaluable desires, it
would not follow that autonomy of thought is unconditionally valuable, for such
interferences could be wrong for reasons other than that they interfere with value.
For example, we could again appeal to the liberal view that interfering with a
person’s desires is pro tanto wrong insofar as it involves a violation of equal respect
or of liberal neutrality. Importantly, it would not obviously follow from such an
appeal that interfering with desires and actions is in any respect more pro tanto
32 For example, Jonathan Quong rejects the view that autonomy can ground the wrongness of
paternalistic interference, and instead argues that its wrongness can instead be grounded on the moral
status of the intervenee. See: J. Quong. 2011. Liberalism Without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. pp. 96–101.
33 P. Briken & M.P. Kafka. Pharmacological treatments for paraphilic patients and sexual offenders.
Current Opinion in Psychiatry 2007; 20: 609–613.
34 For a defence of grounding the wrongness of interference on contingent factors see: Raz. 1986. The
Morality of Freedom. As a response, Quong considers the possibility of controlling a person’s preferences
with a brain chip. He argues that even if the chip had the effect of interfering with only what we call
nondisvaluable desires, it would be still intuitively troubling. Nevertheless, Quong also accepts that this is
not decisive. Quong. 2011. Liberalism Without Perfection. pp. 54–56.
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wrong than interfering with actions alone, since it is not obvious that interfering
with a person’s desires and actions constitutes a graver violation of equal respect or
liberal neutrality than interfering with actions alone.
3.
Recall that, in Section 1, we stipulated that the initial version of IEP could
potentially account for commonly held views concerning the wrongness of three
controversial kinds of interferences, referred to as the Practical Cases. Namely, we
suggested that IEP may be able to account for the views that (i) imposing mind-
altering drugs on criminal offenders is in one respect more pro tanto wrong than
incarcerating them, (ii) nudging people away from certain behaviours is more pro
tanto wrong than prohibiting those behaviours, and (iii) hypnosis, brainwashing and
subliminal advertising are more pro tanto wrong that comparable forms of external
desire frustration. In each case, some forms of internal desire frustration are
considered to be more pro tanto wrong in one respect than comparable forms of
external desire frustration. For the sake of brevity, henceforth we refer to an
interference that is more pro tanto wrong in one respect than external desire
frustration as having special wrongness.
While the initial variant of IEP could account for the special wrongness of the
Practical Cases, in this section we demonstrate that once we have revised IEP, the
number of Practical Cases involving special wrongness is significantly reduced. We
show that the Conditionalized Autonomy Variant does not account for the special
wrongness of many of the most common incidents of the Practical Cases. This is
unlikely to be satisfactory for those who hold that the interferences in the Practical
Cases have special wrongness. As a result, those who hold that there is a special
wrongness in the Practical Cases should either provide a different explanation for
the special wrongness in the Practical Cases, or give up the view that the internal
interference in the Practical Cases are more pro tanto in one respect than an external
interference.
Let us consider the implications of the Conditionalized Autonomy Variant for the
wrongness of the Practical Cases. We suggested in Section 2 that it is not, by reason
of the value of autonomy of thought, invariably more pro tanto wrong in one respect
to frustrate a disvaluable desire by non-autonomously altering it than to externally
frustrate a disvaluable desire. This led us to tentatively adopt the Conditionalized
Autonomy Variant of IEP, which holds only that frustrating a non-disvaluable
desire by non-autonomously altering it is more pro tanto wrong in one respect than
externally frustrating it. But the three Practical Cases can often involve interfering
with disvaluable desires and thus fall outside of the scope of this variant of IEP. In
some instances of criminal offenders being forced to take mind-altering drugs, the
interference alters the agent’s desire to commit a crime. Although there is no
necessary connection between the value of desires and the lawfulness of the actions
it motivates, it is plausible that many desires to commit crimes are all-things-
considered disvaluable. The Conditionalized Autonomy Variant cannot explain why
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frustrating these desires by non-autonomously altering them is in one respect more
pro tanto wrong than externally frustrating them.35
Let us now turn to the implications of the Conditionalized Autonomy Variant for
the wrongness of deploying nudge techniques. This variant entails that the non-
autonomous alteration of desires has special wrongness if the altered desires are not
all-things-considered disvaluable. But many nudge techniques that have been used
or advocated plausibly involve altering desires that are all-things-considered
disvaluable.36
Consider nudges designed to prevent eating fatty food and smoking tobacco. It is
plausible to assume that these are typically both pleasurable activities, and that the
pleasure derived from these activities is valuable. However, both activities can
result in significant harm to the health of the agent, and it is plausible that the
disvalue of this harm frequently exceeds the value of the short-term pleasure
produced by the activities.37 More generally, many proposed nudge techniques seek
to alter desires that are plausibly all things considered disvaluable, and this should
not surprising, since negative evaluations of these desires presumably provide much
of the motivation for introducing these nudges.38
Finally, consider the third of the Practical Cases, namely, hypnosis, brainwash-
ing, and subliminal advertising. While the other two Practical Cases commonly
involve interventions with a person’s disvaluable desires, these cases are more
frequently associated with interference with a person’s valuable desires for the
purposes of producing disvaluable desires or actions. For instance, examples of
subliminal advertising include moving people to buy things that they do not need, or
brainwash and hypnotise people to act in ways that are disvaluable.39 In these cases,
where the hypnosis, brainwashing, and subliminal advertising non-autonomously
alters a person’s valuable desire, then the Conditionalized Autonomy Variant can
account for the special wrongness of these cases. However there could, of course, be
cases in which interventions of this sort are used to non-autonomously alter
disvaluable desires—consider a case in which B hypnotises A not to act in
accordance with A’s autonomous desire to murder her neighbour—and in these
35 Note that our view can explain why even if mind-altering drugs deployed to change the sexuality of
homosexuals were effective, the internal frustration of homosexual desires through chemical castration
would be more wrong than externally frustrating them, because homosexual desires are normally all-
things-considered valuable.
36 To clarify, here we mean that the desire is disvaluable all things considered, taking into account
disvalue for the individual, disvalue for others, and disvalue from an impersonal point of view. It might be
the case that the desire to smoke is disvaluable for the smoker, but valuable in some respect for others,
such as the person who sells cigarettes. We are unable to address this issue adequately here, but it seems
plausible to hold that in these typical cases, the fact that the desire is valuable for others will not be
sufficient to result in an otherwise disvaluable desire being all things considered valuable. We are grateful
for an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
37 This could be because the health-effects themselves diminish future pleasure, or because they are
disvaluable in some other way.
38 If pace Raz, one holds that Conditional Action only applies to moral value, and not all things
considered value, then nudge techniques that interfere with prudentially disvaluable but morally positive
or neutral desires might still have special wrongness according to the Conditionalized Autonomy Variant.
39 For example, in the film The Naked Gun, Jane is hypnotized to murder the Queen.
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cases the Conditionalized Autonomy Variant will not imply that the intervention is
in one respect pro tanto wrong than an external interference with the same desire.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we considered several variants of IEP, and showed that each was
susceptible to counterexamples. The first variant of IEP could not offer a plausible
verdict on Tea Reasons, which involved a morally unproblematic means of desire
frustration. A further variant, the Perception Variant, gave a plausible verdict on Tea
Reasons, but could not account for the wrongness Tea Hypnosis. We then
considered the Resistibility Variant of IEP, but this was also shown to inadequately
capture the wrongness of these cases.
We next considered the Autonomy Variant, which circumvented the difficulties
faced by the other IEP variants, while also being theoretically plausible. While an
external interference frustrates autonomy of action, an internal interference also
interferes with autonomy of thought. We suggested that this constitutes a more
serious interference with autonomy, and so can account for the view that internal
desire frustration is in one respect more pro tanto wrong than external desire
frustration. Nevertheless, we tentatively proposed that the Autonomy Variant might
require further modification because it may be grounded on a dubious view of the
value of autonomous thought. We considered Joseph Raz’s argument concerning the
conditional value of autonomy of action and applied Raz’s argument to the value of
autonomous thought, which we supposed is also conditional. Once this conditional
view of the value of autonomous thought is adopted, we showed that the Autonomy
Variant loses its most obvious explanatory support, and as a consequence, we
tentatively proposed a further variant of IEP: the Conditionalized Autonomy
Variant.
In the final section of the paper, we showed that our weakening of IEP has
significant implications for the wrongness of the interferences in the Practical Cases.
We showed that on Conditionalized Autonomy Variant, many instances of the
Practical Cases do not have special wrongness. This is because a number of
common instances of the Practical Cases involve internal non-autonomous
alteration of desires that are all-things-considered disvaluable. Those who hold
that interferences in these Practical Cases are particularly morally problematic even
when the altered desires are all-things-considered disvaluable should either provide
a different explanation for the wrongness of these interferences, or give up the view
that these interferences are in one respect more pro tanto wrong than the external
frustration of the same desires.
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